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Pascual vs. Francisco-Alfonso G.R. No. 138774.  March 8, 2001

May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?

Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.

Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.

Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160.  When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.

After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters.  They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983.  After verification, Aida learned that  there  was  indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.  Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio  executed a “Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.  By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.

On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.

In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale.  After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.  The dispositive portion reads:

“WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable  thereon,  the  Court hereby renders judgment:

“a) sustaining the validity of the “Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan” executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the defendants;

“b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and

“c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants’ counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of merit.”

In time, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.

After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:

“1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 is declared null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled;

“2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in the name of Gregorio Francisco.

“3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

“4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.

“Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees.”

Hence, this petition.

The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the appellate court.  The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law.  It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:

First:  The kasulatan was simulated.  There was no consideration for the contract of sale.  Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.

As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.

Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00.  She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property.  She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank.  Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.

Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983.  She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value.  They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.

Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void.

Second:  Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent’s legitime.  The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.

Obviously, the sale was Gregorio’s way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter.  The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property.  Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.

According to Article 888, Civil Code:

“The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

“The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.”

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property.  If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father’s estate.  By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate.  His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Heirs of Spouses Sandejas Sr. vs. Lina
G.R. No. 141634. 
February 5, 2001

A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval.  The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it.  In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers.  Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.  Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still alive.  In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under administration.  The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the “Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy” (also referred to as the “Receipt”).  Instead, they assert that because this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted into a money claim.

We disagree.  Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to sell.  Not exactly.  In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition.  The vendor’s obligation to convey the title does not become effective in case of failure to pay.

On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of a court approval, not full payment.  There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement.  In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to respondent.  This they could do upon the court’s approval, even before full payment.  Hence, their contract was a conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.

When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate court’s grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners’ obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor.  The condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected.  Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what they had expressly agreed upon.

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent’s estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.  Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration.  A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs.  It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court’s permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.

Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85).  It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.  Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

Petitioners’ computation is correct.  The CA computed Eliodoro’s share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property.  It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.

Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent’s entire estate – under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.  After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices.

Liyao Jr vs Tanhoti-Liyao
G.R. No. 138961
March 7, 2002

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao” against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner “was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,” petitioner having been “recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, “Contract of Separation,” executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Eceta vs. Eceta G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004

We note Rosalina’s attempt to mislead the Court by representing that this case is one for compulsory recognition, partition and accounting with damages. Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only.  The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue.  In fact, both parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter.

Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter.  By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa, thus:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.  In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.  The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required.  In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

Speed Distributing Corp vs. CA G.R. No. 149351.  March 17, 2004

To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the Branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy. The determination of whether a contract is simulated or not is an issue that could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.

In the present recourse, it is clear that the private respondent’s complaint in the RTC is not an intra-corporate case.  For one thing, the private respondent has never been a stockholder of Leslim, or of Speed for that matter.  The complaint is one for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale executed by Leslim in favor of Speed over the property covered by TCT No. T-36617 in the name of Leslim, the cancellation of TCT No. T-116716 in the name of Speed, as well as the Secretary’s Certificate dated August 22, 1994. The private respondent alleged that since her deceased husband, Pastor Lim, acquired the property during their marriage, the said property is  conjugal in nature, although registered under the name of Leslim under TCT No. T-36617. She asserted that the petitioners connived to deprive the estate of Pastor Lim and his heirs of their possession and ownership over the said property using a falsified Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of Directors of Leslim had a meeting on August 19, 1995, when, in fact, no such meeting was held.  Petitioner Lita Lim was never a stockholder of Leslim or a member of its Board of Directors; her husband, petitioner Ireneo Marcelo was the Vice-President of Speed; and, petitioner Pedro Aquino was Leslim’s corporate secretary.  The private respondent further averred that the amount of P3,900,000.00,  the purchase price of the property under the deed of absolute sale, was not paid to Leslim, and that petitioners Spouses Marcelo and petitioner Pedro Aquino contrived the said deed to consummate their devious scheme and chicanery.  The private respondent concluded that the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated; hence, null and void.

We are convinced that on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, the court a quo had jurisdiction over the case.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides as follows:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest.— A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

The private respondent filed the complaint as one of the heirs of Pastor Lim, who died intestate on June 11, 1994. She was, in fact, the surviving spouse of the deceased, a compulsory heir by operation of law.  The general rule under the law on succession is that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called upon to succeed by operation of law to the inheritance without the need of further proceedings.  Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the properties, rights and obligations of a party, not extinguished by his death. Although the private respondent was appointed by the probate court as a special administratrix of the estate of Pastor Lim, she had the right, apart from her being a special administratrix, to file the complaint against the petitioners for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and TCT Nos. T-36617 and T-116716. Indeed, iEmnace vs. Court of Appeals, we held that:

On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner’s objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue.  As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

In her complaint, the private respondent sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Leslim Corporation in favor of Speed, as well as TCT No. T-36617 under its name. Thus, Leslim Corporation is an indispensable party, and should be impleaded as a party-defendant conformably to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.— Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

As Leslim Corporation was a party to the deed, its interests in the subject of the action and the outcome thereof is such that the trial court could not proceed without its presence.  All actuations of the trial court subsequent to the filing of the complaint are null and void, not only as to Leslim Corporation, but also as to the present parties. All the compulsory heirs of the deceased must also be impleaded as plaintiffs, being indispensable parties. Thus, the private respondent needs to amend her complaint in the court a quo to include all indispensable parties; otherwise, her claim would be dismissed.

Manongsong vs. Estimo
G. R. No. 136773. 
June 25, 2003

We likewise find no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes.  As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller.  When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. 

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. The presence of these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself.  The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.

If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners’ case.  Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the latter’s children, including petitioners, by succession.  There would then be no basis for petitioners’ claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra.  On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents’ position since they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.

Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarra’s estate.  There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners’ complaint for partition of the Property.

Maglasang vs. Heirs of Cabatingan G.R. No. 131953.  June 5, 2002

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a “Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot” covering one-half (½) portion of the former’s house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.). These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:

“That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x  x  x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x  x  x” (Emphasis Ours)

On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Respondents allege, inter alia, that petitioners,  through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan’s fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the disputed properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.

Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were  made by the late  Conchita Cabatingan  “in consideration  of  the  love and affection of the donor” for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan’s death. In addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.

Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit.

In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.” In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:

(1)  It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2)  That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

(3)  That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan’s death. The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. 

We held in Meimban case that the donation is a mortis causa donation, and that the above quoted provision establishes the donor’s intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former’s death. Further:

“As the donation is in the nature of a  mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.  As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78 SCRA 245,253), “If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor’s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee because of the donor’s death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.  (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).”

one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.  This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations.  If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferrred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.

Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:

“ART. 805.   Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

ART. 806.  Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.  The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)”

The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law.

Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation null and void.

How to become a Christian

Who is God? What is man? Who is Christ? Repent and believe

the Kristo
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Republic Act No. 386
The Civil Code of the Philippines

Title IV. Succession
Note: To get to the article you want, click the Chapter, Section and Subsection headings.

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Article 774     Definition of succession
Article 775     Definition of decedent         
Article 776     What inheritance includes
Article 777     Rights to succession transmitted upon death       
Article 778     Kinds of succession
Article 779     Testamentary succession
Article 780     Mixed succession
Article 781     After acquired properties
Article 782     Heirs, donees and legatees
           
Chapter 2. Testamentary Succession

Article 783     Elements and characteristics of wills
Article 784     Making of a will a strictly personal act
Article 785     Discretion of a third person
Article 786     When testator entrusts third person
Article 787     Prohibition on third person
Article 788     Different interpretation of dispositions
Article 789     Ambiguity in a will
Article 790     Interpretation of words of a will
Article 791     Rules in interpretation; as a whole, preference for testacy,                         etc.
Article 792     Effect of invalid dispositions
Article 793     Property acquired after making of a will
Article 794     What interest may be disposed of
Article 795     Validity of will as to its form

Subsection 2. Testamentary Capacity and Interest

Article 796    Who can make a will
Article 797     Age requirement
Article 798     Soundness of mind at execution of the will
Article 799     Requisites for soundness of mind
Article 800     Presumption of soundness of mind
 Article 801    Effect of supervening incapacity
Article 802     Capacity of married woman to make a will
Article 803     What married woman can dispose of by will

Subsection 3. Forms of Wills

Article 804     Written will
Article 805     Requirements for notarial will
Article 806     Acknowledgment by notary public
Article 807     When testator is deaf or deaf-mute
Article 808     When testator is blind
Article 809    Substantial compliance with requirements
Article 810     Holographic will
Article 811     Probate of holographic will
Article 812     Dispositions below testator’s signature
Article 813     How to cure defects in holographic will
Article 814     Aunthentication of insertion, cancellation, erasure or                         alteration
Article 815     Formalities of a will executed by a Filipino in a foreign                         country
Article 816     Formalities of an alien’s will executed abroad
Article 817     Formalities of a will executed by alien here in the                         Philippines
Article 818     Prohibition against joint wills
Article 819     Joint wills executed abroad by Filipinos not valid here

Subsection 4. Witnesses to Wills

Article 820     Requirements for witnesses to a notarial will
Article 821     Who are disqualified
Article 822     Subsequent incompetence
Article 823     Witnesses cannot inherit from testator
Article 824     Creditors not competent witnesses

Subsection 5. Codicils and Incorporation by Reference
Article 825     Definition of codicil
Article 826     Formalities of a codicil
Article 827     Incorporation by reference

Subsection 6. Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions
Article 828     Revocability of a will
Article 829     Revocation done outside of Philippines
Article 830     Ways of revoking a will
Article 831     Subsequent wills; implied revocation
Article 832     Revocation even if new will is inoperative
Article 833     Revocation based on false or illegal cause
Article 834     Revocation and recognition of illegitimate child

Subsection 7. Republication and Revival of Wills

Article 835     What is republication
Article 836     Republication by codicil
Article 837     Revocation of second will does not revive first will

Subsection 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

Article 838     Probate of a will       
Article 839     Grounds for disallowance of a will

Section 2. Institution of Heir

Article 840     Definition of institution of heir
Article 841     Will valid even in non-institution of heir
Article 842     Freedom of disposition by testator; limitation
Article 843     Designation of heir by name and surname
Article 844     Effect of error in name, surname and circumstances of an                         heir
Article 845     Disposition to unknown person void
Article 846     Heirs instituted without designation of shares
Article 847     When designation is individually and also collectively
Article 848     Institution of brothers and sisters, full and half-blood
Article 849     Simultaneous institution by person and his children
Article 850     False cause in institution of heir
Article 851     Institution to only part of estate
Article 852     When testator’s intent is to give whole of estate
Article 853     When institution exceeds estate
Article 854     Preterition or omission of a compulsory heir
Article 855     Share of omitted child or descendant
Article 856     No transmission of rights by voluntary or compulsory heir                         who dies before the testator; exceptions

Section 3. Substitution of Heirs

Article 857     What is substitution
Article 858     Ways of substitution
Article 859     Simple or common substitution
Article 860     Brief or compendious substitution
Article 861     Reciprocal substitution        
Article 862     Effect on the substitution of charges and conditions                         imposed on the institution
Article 863     Fideicommissary substitution
Article 864     Fideicommissary substitution can never burden the                         legitime
Article 865     Fideicommissary substitution must be made expressly
Article 866     If second heir predeceases the fiduciary
Article 867     Ineffective provisions: fideicommissary substitution not                         made expressly, prohibition to alienate, payment of                         income or pension, secret instructions
Article 868     Effect of nullity of fideicommissary substitution
Article 869     Grant of usufruct
Article 870     Prohibition to alienate estate for more than twenty years                         void

Section 4. Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Testamentary Dispositions with a Term

Article 871     Condition, purpose or cause of institution 
Article 872     No charge, condition or substitution on legitime
Article 873     Conditions impossible, against law or good customs not                         imposed and cannot prejudice the heir
Article 874     Absolute condition not to contract a first or subsequent                         marriage
Article 875     Disposition captatoria
Article 876     Potestative conditions
Article 877     Casual and mixed conditions
Article 878     Effect of suspensive conditions
Article 879     Caucion muciana; negative potestative condition
Article 880     When estate placed under administration
Article 881     Appointment of administrator
Article 882     Modal institution
Article 883     Analogous or substantial compliance
Article 884     Suppletory effect of rules on conditional obligation
Article 885     Institution with a term valid

Section 5. Legitime

Article 886     Definition of legitime
Article 887     Who are compulsory heirs
Article 888     Amount of legitime of legitimate children and descendants
Article 889     Amount of legitime of legitimate parents and ascendants
Article 890     Division of legitimes in ascending direct line
Article 891     Reserva troncal
Article 892     Legitime of widow or widower concurring with legitimate                         descendants
Article 893     Legitime of surviving spouse concurring with legitimate                         ascendants
Article 894     Legitime of surviving spouse concurring with illegitimate                         children
Article 895     Legitime of legitimate children concurring with illegitimate                         children
Article 896     Legitime of illegitimate children surviving with legitimate                         parents or ascendants
Article 897     Legitime of surviving spouse concurring with children
Article 898     Legitime of surviving spouse concurring with legitimate                         and illegitimate children or descendants
Article 899     Legitime of surviving spouse concurring with legitimate                         parents or ascendants and illegitimate children
Article 900     Legitime of surviving spouse as the only compulsory heir
Article 901     Legitime of illegitimate children as the only compulsory                         heir
Article 902     Transmission of hereditary rights of illegitimate children
Article 903     Legitime of illegitimate parents as the only compulsory                         heirs
Article 904     No deprivation or burden upon legitime of legitimate heirs
Article 905     Renunciation or compromise on future legitime
Article 906     Full satisfaction of legitime
Article 907     Inofficious or excessive testamentary disposition
Article 908     Computation of net hereditary estate
Article 909     Donations to children charged to their legitime
Article 910     Donations to illegitimate child
Article 911     Order of preference; reduction in donation
Article 912     Reduction of inofficious donations
Article 913     Sale at public auction of devised real property
Article 914     Disposal of free portion
Section 6. Disinheritance

Article 915     Disinheritance defined
Article 916     Disinheritance valid only through a will
Article 917     Burden of proof as truth of cause of disinheritance
Article 918     Effects of ineffective disinheritance
Article 919     Causes for disinheritance of children and descendants
Article 920     Causes for disinheritance of parents and ascendants
Article 921     Causes for disinheriting a spouse
Article 922     Effects of subsequent reconciliation
Article 923     Right of representation of disinherited heir
Section 7. Legacies and Devises

Article 924     What may be bequeathed or devised
Article 925     Grant of legacies and devises
Article 926     When heirs are charged
Article 927     Solidary liability of heirs who take possession of estate
Article 928     Liability for eviction
Article 929     Grant by testator of part of or an interest in the thing
Article 930     Error in ownership    
Article 931     When testator  orders acquisition
Article 932     When thing already belongs to the legatee or devisee
Article 933     Alienation by legatee or devisee
Article 934     If things is pledged or mortgaged
Article 935     Legacy of credit or remission, or release of debt
Article 936     Lapse of legacy when testator sues debtor-legatee
Article 937     Generic legacy or release or remission
Article 938     Non-application of legacy to credit of legatee or devisee
Article 939     Undue payments; solution indebiti
Article 940     Alternative legacies or devisees
Article 941     Legacy of generic personal thing
Article 942     Right of choice given to heir, legate or devisee
Article 943     When choice passed on to recipient’s heirs
Article 944     Period of legacy for education and support
Article 945     Periodical pension or amount
Article 946     When thing bequeathed involves usufruct
Article 947     When legatee or devisee acquires rights to the thing
Article 948     When legatee or devisee acquires ownership
Article 949     Generic gifts; fruits and interests
Article 950     Order of preference in payments of legacies or devisees
Article 951     Accession and accessories
Article 952     Delivery of legacy or devise
Article 953     Requests for delivery and possession
Article 954     Partly onerous, partly gratuitous gifts
Article 955     Onerous and gratuitous gifts
Article 956     Repudiation of or incapacity to accept legacy or devise
Article 957     When legacy or devise is without effect; transformation,                         alienation and loss
Article 958     Mistake in naming the thing
Article 959     Disposition in general terms in favor of testator’s relatives


Chapter 1. General Provisions

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (n)

Art. 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property is transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the testator. (n)

Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. (659)

Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

Art. 778. Succession may be:

(1) Testamentary;

(2) Legal or intestate; or

(3) Mixed. (n)

Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)

Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law. (n)

Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n)

Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.

Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are respectively given by virtue of a will. (n)

Chapter 2. Testamentary Succession

Section 1. - Wills

Subsection 1. - Wills in General

Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)

Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in whole or in part to the discretion of a third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney. (670a)

Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person. (670a)

Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums of money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or applied. (671a)

Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another person has to determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)

Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. (n)

Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations. (n)

Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained.

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)

Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (n)

Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n)

Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention. (n)

Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest which the testator could devise or bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the will that he intended to convey a less interest. (n)

Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. (n)

Subsection 2. - Testamentary Capacity and Intent

Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will. (662)

Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n)

Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution. (n)

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. (n)

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. (n)

Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)

Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without the consent of her husband, and without the authority of the court. (n)

Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her separate property as well as her share of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property. (n)

Subsection 3. - Forms of Wills

Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court. (n)

Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)

Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. (n)

Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)

Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)

Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must be dated and signed by him in order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n)

Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. (n)

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)

Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n)

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)

Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)

Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669)

Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. (733a)

Subsection 4. - Witnesses to Wills

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code. (n)

Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony. (n)

Art. 822. If the witnesses attesting the execution of a will are competent at the time of attesting, their becoming subsequently incompetent shall not prevent the allowance of the will. (n)

Art. 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will. However, such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise or legacy had not been made or given. (n)

Art. 824. A mere charge on the estate of the testator for the payment of debts due at the time of the testator's death does not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will. (n)

Subsection 5. - Codicils and Incorporation by Reference

Art. 825. A codicil is supplement or addition to a will, made after the execution of a will and annexed to be taken as a part thereof, by which disposition made in the original will is explained, added to, or altered. (n)

Art. 826. In order that a codicil may be effective, it shall be executed as in the case of a will. (n)

Art. 827. If a will, executed as required by this Code, incorporates into itself by reference any document or paper, such document or paper shall not be considered a part of the will unless the following requisites are present:

(1) The document or paper referred to in the will must be in existence at the time of the execution of the will;

(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the same, stating among other things the number of pages thereof;

(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the document or paper referred to therein; and

(4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every page, except in case of voluminous books of account or inventories. (n)

Subsection 6. - Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions

Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void. (737a)

Art. 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n)

Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:

(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (n)

Art. 831. Subsequent wills which do not revoke the previous ones in an express manner, annul only such dispositions in the prior wills as are inconsistent with or contrary to those contained in the latter wills. (n)

Art. 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will shall take effect, even if the new will should become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs, devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation. (740a)

Art. 833. A revocation of a will based on a false cause or an illegal cause is null and void. (n)

Art. 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made should be revoked. (714)

Subsection 7. - Republication and Revival of Wills

Art. 835. The testator cannot republish, without reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions contained in a previous one which is void as to its form. (n)

Art. 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will has the effect of republishing the will as modified by the codicil. (n)

Art. 837. If after making a will, the testator makes a second will expressly revoking the first, the revocation of the second will does not revive the first will, which can be revived only by another will or codicil. (739a)

Subsection 8. - Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's a death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (n)

Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. (n)

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Section 2. - Institution of Heir

Art. 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of which a testator designates in his will the person or persons who are to succeed him in his property and transmissible rights and obligations. (n)

Art. 841. A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.

In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs. (764)

Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. (763a)

Art. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the instituted heir may be known.

Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he designate him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be valid. (772)

Art. 844. An error in the name, surname, or circumstances of the heir shall not vitiate the institution when it is possible, in any other manner, to know with certainty the person instituted.

If among persons having the same names and surnames, there is a similarity of circumstances in such a way that, even with the use of the other proof, the person instituted cannot be identified, none of them shall be an heir. (773a)

Art. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a definite class or group of persons shall be valid. (750a)

Art. 846. Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts. (765)

Art. 847. When the testator institutes some heirs individually and others collectively as when he says, "I designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of C," those collectively designated shall be considered as individually instituted, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise. (769a)

Art. 848. If the testator should institute his brothers and sisters, and he has some of full blood and others of half blood, the inheritance shall be distributed equally unless a different intention appears. (770a)

Art. 849. When the testator calls to the succession a person and his children they are all deemed to have been instituted simultaneously and not successively. (771)

Art. 850. The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. (767a)

Art. 851. If the testator has instituted only one heir, and the institution is limited to an aliquot part of the inheritance, legal succession takes place with respect to the remainder of the estate.

The same rule applies if the testator has instituted several heirs, each being limited to an aliquot part, and all the parts do not cover the whole inheritance. (n)

Art. 852. If it was the intention of the testator that the instituted heirs should become sole heirs to the whole estate, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, and each of them has been instituted to an aliquot part of the inheritance and their aliquot parts together do not cover the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, each part shall be increased proportionally. (n)

Art. 853. If each of the instituted heirs has been given an aliquot part of the inheritance, and the parts together exceed the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, each part shall be reduced proportionally. (n)

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. (814a)

Art. 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs. (1080a)

Art. 856. A voluntary heir who dies before the testator transmits nothing to his heirs.

A compulsory heir who dies before the testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, and one who renounces the inheritance, shall transmit no right to his own heirs except in cases expressly provided for in this Code. (766a)

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Section 3. - Substitution of Heirs

Art. 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. (n)

Art. 858. Substitution of heirs may be:

(1) Simple or common;

(2) Brief or compendious;

(3) Reciprocal; or

(4) Fideicommissary. (n)

Art. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided. (774)

Art. 860. Two or more persons may be substituted for one; and one person for two or more heirs. (778)

Art. 861. If heirs instituted in unequal shares should be reciprocally substituted, the substitute shall acquire the share of the heir who dies, renounces, or is incapacitated, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise. If there are more than one substitute, they shall have the same share in the substitution as in the institution. (779a)

Art. 862. The substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted heir, unless and testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to the heir instituted. (780)

Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator. (781a)

Art. 864. A fideicommissary substitution can never burden the legitime. (782a)

Art. 865. Every fideicommissary substitution must be expressly made in order that it may be valid.

The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver the inheritance to the second heir, without other deductions than those which arise from legitimate expenses, credits and improvements, save in the case where the testator has provided otherwise. (783)

Art. 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to the succession from the time of the testator's death, even though he should die before the fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass to his heirs. (784)

Art. 867. The following shall not take effect:

(1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are not made in an express manner, either by giving them this name, or imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation to deliver the property to a second heir;

(2) Provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to alienate, and even a temporary one, beyond the limit fixed in article 863;

(3) Those which impose upon the heir the charge of paying to various persons successively, beyond the limit prescribed in article 863, a certain income or pension;

(4) Those which leave to a person the whole part of the hereditary property in order that he may apply or invest the same according to secret instructions communicated to him by the testator. (785a)

Art. 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary substitution does not prejudice the validity of the institution of the heirs first designated; the fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered as not written. (786)

Art. 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves to a person the whole or part of the inheritance, and to another the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but successively, the provisions of Article 863 shall apply. (787a)

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void. (n)

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Section 4. - Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Testamentary Dispositions With a Term

Art. 871. The institution of an heir may be made conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause. (790a)

Art. 872. The testator cannot impose any charge, condition, or substitution whatsoever upon the legitimes prescribed in this Code. Should he do so, the same shall be considered as not imposed. (813a)

Art. 873. Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good customs shall be considered as not imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir, even if the testator should otherwise provide. (792a)

Art. 874. An absolute condition not to contract a first or subsequent marriage shall be considered as not written unless such condition has been imposed on the widow or widower by the deceased spouse, or by the latter's ascendants or descendants.

Nevertheless, the right of usufruct, or an allowance or some personal prestation may be devised or bequeathed to any person for the time during which he or she should remain unmarried or in widowhood. (793a)

Art. 875. Any disposition made upon the condition that the heir shall make some provision in his will in favor of the testator or of any other person shall be void. (794a)

Art. 876. Any purely potestative condition imposed upon an heir must be fulfilled by him as soon as he learns of the testator's death.

This rule shall not apply when the condition, already complied with, cannot be fulfilled again. (795a)

Art. 877. If the condition is casual or mixed, it shall be sufficient if it happens or be fulfilled at any time before or after the death of the testator, unless he has provided otherwise.

Should it have existed or should it have been fulfilled at the time the will was executed and the testator was unaware thereof, it shall be deemed as complied with.

If he had knowledge thereof, the condition shall be considered fulfilled only when it is of such a nature that it can no longer exist or be complied with again. (796)

Art. 878. A disposition with a suspensive term does not prevent the instituted heir from acquiring his rights and transmitting them to his heirs even before the arrival of the term. (799a)

Art. 879. If the potestative condition imposed upon the heir is negative, or consists in not doing or not giving something, he shall comply by giving a security that he will not do or give that which has been prohibited by the testator, and that in case of contravention he will return whatever he may have received, together with its fruits and interests. (800a)

Art. 880. If the heir be instituted under a suspensive condition or term, the estate shall be placed under administration until the condition is fulfilled, or until it becomes certain that it cannot be fulfilled, or until the arrival of the term.

The same shall be done if the heir does not give the security required in the preceding article. (801a)

Art. 881. The appointment of the administrator of the estate mentioned in the preceding article, as well as the manner of the administration and the rights and obligations of the administrator shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (804a)

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. (797a)

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

If the person interested in the condition should prevent its fulfillment, without the fault of the heir, the condition shall be deemed to have been complied with. (798a)

Art. 884. Conditions imposed by the testator upon the heirs shall be governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by this Section. (791a)

Art. 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or cease shall be valid.

In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the property until after having given sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir. (805)

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Section 5. - Legitime

Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806)

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)

Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)

Art. 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or ascendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estates of their children and descendants.

The children or descendants may freely dispose of the other half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (809a)

Art. 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate parents shall be divided between them equally; if one of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor.

If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is survived by ascendants of equal degree of the paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally between both lines. If the ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall pertain entirely to the ones nearest in degree of either line. (810)

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871)

Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same.

If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.

In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be taken from the portion that can be freely disposed of by the testator. (834a)

Art. 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.

This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the estate. (836a)

Art. 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-third of the hereditary estate of the deceased and the illegitimate children to another third. The remaining third shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (n)

Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.

The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an acknowledged natural, nor a natural child by legal fiction, shall be equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.

The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied. (840a)

Art. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with legitimate parents or ascendants of the deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the portion at the free disposal of the testator. (841a)

Art. 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children which must be taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of. (n)

Art. 898. If the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and with illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal fiction, the share of the surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in the preceding article. (n)

Art. 899. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants and with illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate of the deceased which must be taken from the free portion, and the illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from the disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth of the estate. (n)

Art. 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half. (837a)

If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph. (n)

Art. 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate children and no other compulsory heirs, such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased.

The other half shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (842a)

Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half of the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate children are left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or widower survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is one-fourth of the hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate. (n)

Art. 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in cases expressly specified by law.

Neither can he impose upon the same any burden, encumbrance, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (813a)

Art. 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a future legitime between the person owing it and his compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may claim the same upon the death of the former; but they must bring to collation whatever they may have received by virtue of the renunciation or compromise. (816)

Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. (815)

Art. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. (817)

Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a)

Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.

Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last will.

Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this Code. (819a)

Art. 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may have received during the lifetime of his father or mother, shall be charged to his legitime.

Should they exceed the portion that can be freely disposed of, they shall be reduced in the manner prescribed by this Code. (847a)

Art. 911. After the legitime has been determined in accordance with the three preceding articles, the reduction shall be made as follows:

(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be covered, reducing or annulling, if necessary, the devises or legacies made in the will;

(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata, without any distinction whatever.

If the testator has directed that a certain devise or legacy be paid in preference to others, it shall not suffer any reduction until the latter have been applied in full to the payment of the legitime.

(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life annuity, whose value may be considered greater than that of the disposable portion, the compulsory heirs may choose between complying with the testamentary provision and delivering to the devisee or legatee the part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely dispose. (820a)

Art. 912. If the devise subject to reduction should consist of real property, which cannot be conveniently divided, it shall go to the devisee if the reduction does not absorb one-half of its value; and in a contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter shall reimburse each other in cash for what respectively belongs to them.

The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime. (821)

Art. 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to avail themselves of the right granted by the preceding article, any heir or devisee who did not have such right may exercise it; should the latter not make use of it, the property shall be sold at public auction at the instance of any one of the interested parties. (822)

Art. 914. The testator may devise and bequeath the free portion as he may deem fit. (n)

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Section 6. - Disinheritance

Art. 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes expressly stated by law. (848a)

Art. 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. (849)

Art. 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the testator, if the disinherited heir should deny it. (850)

Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a)

Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. (756, 853, 674a)

Art. 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;

(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found to be false;

(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;

(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this Code;

(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without justifiable cause;

(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a reconciliation between them. (756, 854, 674a)

Art. 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:

(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false;

(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;

(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority;

(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse. (756, 855, 674a)

Art. 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made. (856)

Art. 923. The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes the legitime. (857)

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Section 7. - Legacies and Devises

Art. 924. All things and rights which are within the commerce of man may be bequeathed or devised. (865a)

Art. 925. A testator may charge with legacies and devises not only his compulsory heirs but also the legatees and devisees.

The latter shall be liable for the charge only to the extent of the value of the legacy or the devise received by them. The compulsory heirs shall not be liable for the charge beyond the amount of the free portion given them. (858a)

Art. 926. When the testator charges one of the heirs with a legacy or devise, he alone shall be bound.

Should he not charge anyone in particular, all shall be liable in the same proportion in which they may inherit. (859)

Art. 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the loss or destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed, even though only one of them should have been negligent. (n)

Art. 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the legacy or devise shall be liable in case of eviction, if the thing is indeterminate and is indicated only by its kind. (860)

Art. 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a part of, or an interest in the thing bequeathed, the legacy or devise shall be understood limited to such part or interest, unless the testator expressly declares that he gives the thing in its entirety. (864a)

Art. 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. (862a)

Art. 931. If the testator orders that a thing belonging to another be acquired in order that it be given to a legatee or devisee, the heir upon whom the obligation is imposed or the estate must acquire it and give the same to the legatee or devisee; but if the owner of the thing refuses to alienate the same, or demands an excessive price therefor, the heir or the estate shall only be obliged to give the just value of the thing. (861a)

Art. 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at the time of the execution of the will already belonged to the legatee or devisee shall be ineffective, even though another person may have some interest therein.

If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from such interest or encumbrance, the legacy or devise shall be valid to that extent. (866a)

Art. 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the legatee or devisee at the time of the execution of the will, the legacy or devise shall be without effect, even though it may have subsequently alienated by him.

If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously after such time, he can claim nothing by virtue of the legacy or devise; but if it has been acquired by onerous title he can demand reimbursement from the heir or the estate. (878a)

Art. 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise something pledged or mortgaged to secure a recoverable debt before the execution of the will, the estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the contrary intention appears.

The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or mortgaged after the execution of the will.

Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which the thing bequeathed is burdened, passes with it to the legatee or devisee. (867a)

Art. 935. The legacy of a credit against a third person or of the remission or release of a debt of the legatee shall be effective only as regards that part of the credit or debt existing at the time of the death of the testator.

In the first case, the estate shall comply with the legacy by assigning to the legatee all rights of action it may have against the debtor. In the second case, by giving the legatee an acquittance, should he request one.

In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all interests on the credit or debt which may be due the testator at the time of his death. (870a)

Art. 936. The legacy referred to in the preceding article shall lapse if the testator, after having made it, should bring an action against the debtor for the payment of his debt, even if such payment should not have been effected at the time of his death.

The legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him is understood to discharge only the right of pledge. (871)

Art. 937. A generic legacy of release or remission of debts comprises those existing at the time of the execution of the will, but not subsequent ones. (872)

Art. 938. A legacy or devise made to a creditor shall not be applied to his credit, unless the testator so expressly declares.

In the latter case, the creditor shall have the right to collect the excess, if any, of the credit or of the legacy or devise. (837a)

Art. 939. If the testator orders the payment of what he believes he owes but does not in fact owe, the disposition shall be considered as not written. If as regards a specified debt more than the amount thereof is ordered paid, the excess is not due, unless a contrary intention appears.

The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the fulfillment of natural obligations. (n)

Art. 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the choice is presumed to be left to the heir upon whom the obligation to give the legacy or devise may be imposed, or the executor or administrator of the estate if no particular heir is so obliged.

If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been given the choice, dies before making it, this right shall pass to the respective heirs.

Once made, the choice is irrevocable.

In the alternative legacies or devises, except as herein provided, the provisions of this Code regulating obligations of the same kind shall be observed, save such modifications as may appear from the intention expressed by the testator. (874a)

Art. 941. A legacy of generic personal property shall be valid even if there be no things of the same kind in the estate.

A devise of indeterminate real property shall be valid only if there be immovable property of its kind in the estate.

The right of choice shall belong to the executor or administrator who shall comply with the legacy by the delivery of a thing which is neither of inferior nor of superior quality. (875a)

Art. 942. Whenever the testator expressly leaves the right of choice to the heir, or to the legatee or devisee, the former may give or the latter may choose whichever he may prefer. (876a)

Art. 943. If the heir, legatee or devisee cannot make the choice, in case it has been granted him, his right shall pass to his heirs; but a choice once made shall be irrevocable. (877a)

Art. 944. A legacy for education lasts until the legatee is of age, or beyond the age of majority in order that the legatee may finish some professional, vocational or general course, provided he pursues his course diligently.

A legacy for support lasts during the lifetime of the legatee, if the testator has not otherwise provided.

If the testator has not fixed the amount of such legacies, it shall be fixed in accordance with the social standing and the circumstances of the legatee and the value of the estate.

If the testator or during his lifetime used to give the legatee a certain sum of money or other things by way of support, the same amount shall be deemed bequeathed, unless it be markedly disproportionate to the value of the estate. (879a)

Art. 945. If a periodical pension, or a certain annual, monthly, or weekly amount is bequeathed, the legatee may petition the court for the first installment upon the death of the testator, and for the following ones which shall be due at the beginning of each period; such payment shall not be returned, even though the legatee should die before the expiration of the period which has commenced. (880a)

Art. 946. If the thing bequeathed should be subject to a usufruct, the legatee or devisee shall respect such right until it is legally extinguished. (868a)

Art. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devises from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)

Art. 948. If the legacy or device is of a specific and determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the income which was due and unpaid before the latter's death.

From the moment of the testator's death, the thing bequeathed shall be at the risk of the legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or deterioration, and shall be benefited by its increase or improvement, without prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or administrator. (882a)

Art. 949. If the bequest should not be of a specific and determinate thing, but is generic or of quantity, its fruits and interests from the time of the death of the testator shall pertain to the legatee or devisee if the testator has expressly so ordered. (884a)

Art. 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to cover all the legacies or devises, their payment shall be made in the following order:

(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;

(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be preferential;

(3) Legacies for support;

(4) Legacies for education;

(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing which forms a part of the estate;

(6) All others pro rata. (887a)

Art. 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with all its accessories and accessories and in the condition in which it may be upon the death of the testator. (883a)

Art. 952. The heir, charged with a legacy or devise, or the executor or administrator of the estate, must deliver the very thing bequeathed if he is able to do so and cannot discharge this obligation by paying its value.

Legacies of money must be paid in cash, even though the heir or the estate may not have any.

The expenses necessary for the delivery of the thing bequeathed shall be for the account of the heir or the estate, but without prejudice to the legitime. (886a)

Art. 953. The legatee or devisee cannot take possession of the thing bequeathed upon his own authority, but shall request its delivery and possession of the heir charged with the legacy or devise, or of the executor or administrator of the estate should he be authorized by the court to deliver it. (885a)

Art. 954. The legatee or devisee cannot accept a part of the legacy or devise and repudiate the other, if the latter be onerous.

Should he die before having accepted the legacy or devise, leaving several heirs, some of the latter may accept and the others may repudiate the share respectively belonging to them in the legacy or devise. (889a)

Art. 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or devises, one of which is onerous, cannot renounce the onerous one and accept the other. If both are onerous or gratuitous, he shall be free to accept or renounce both, or to renounce either. But if the testator intended that the two legacies or devises should be inseparable from each other, the legatee or devisee must either accept or renounce both.

Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a legatee or devisee may waive the inheritance and accept the legacy or devise, or renounce the latter and accept the former, or waive or accept both. (890a)

Art. 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or if the legacy or devise for any reason should become ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of the estate, except in cases of substitution and of the right of accretion. (888a)

Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not retain either the form or the denomination it had;

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;

(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death without the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its kind, in accordance with the provisions of Article 928. (869a)

Art. 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing bequeathed or devised, is of no consequence, if it is possible to identify the thing which the testator intended to bequeath or devise. (n)

Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood to be in favor of those nearest in degree. (751)

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